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RATIONALE OF CORPORATE AND NON-
CORPORATE SURETYSHIP
DECISIONS.-II
By WALTER E. TREANOR*
(B) The Corporate Surety.
In my introductory remarks40 I suggested that the private
gratuitous surety is being rapidly displaced by the corporate
compensated surety. If one were to take literally the words of
many decisions he would perforce conclude that with the passing
of the private surety the whole institution of suretyship is being
converted into insurance. We are told not merely that "their
(corporate sureties') contracts are policies of insurance and
should be so construed," and that "the rule applicable to con-
tracts of life and fire insurance is the rule by analogy most ap-
plicable to a contract like that in this case," but also assured
that "corporations entering into contracts of this character may
call themselves guaranty or surety companies, but their business
is, in all essential particulars, that of insurers ....- 43
Before examining the substantive distinctions between cor-
porate suretyship and insurance I shall consider a few typical
opinions, chiefly from Federal decisions, which deal with rules
of interpretation and construction of contracts of surety com-
panies.
The present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, while sitting
as a circuit judge, made the following statement:
"It is a well established rule in the construction of insurance policies
of this character, which the insured accepts for the purpose of covering
all accidents, to construe all the language used to limit the liability of the
company strictly against the company. Policies are drawn by the legal
advisers of the company, who study with care the decisions of the courts,
and, with these in mind, attempt to limit as nearly as possible the scope
of the insurance. It is only a fair rule, therefore, which courts have
* See biographical note p. 223.
40 3 Ind. Law Jour. 105.
41 Whitestown v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co. (1911), 131 N. Y. S.
390; affirmed 132 N. Y. S. 1149 and 209 N. Y. 512; 102 N. E. 1115. In
Topeka v. Federal Union Surety Co. (1914), 130 C. C. A. 364, 213 Fed.
958, the court says that "Contracts of such companies bear a distinct
analogy to insurance, and are governed by the same rules in construction"
and speaks of a corporate surety as one "which is engaged in the business
of becoming surety for premiums which are supposed to be based upon the
amount of such risks." (Italics mine.)
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adopted to resolve any doubt or ambiguity in favor of the insured, and
against the insurer."42
This was said in connection with the construing of an acci-
dent insurance policy, but is of interest because this case is cited
later as authority for rules of construction of corporate surety
bonds. The excerpt states concisely a rule regularly applied in
the construction of insurance contracts; and, obviously, it is
merely a statement in insurance terms of the same rule that
Professor Williston sets out as a rule of interpretation of con-
tracts generally.
The following year a Federal circuit court was called upon to
pass upon the rules of construction applied by a district court
to an ordinary fidelity bond. The court summed up the ques-
tion as follows:
"With reference to bonds of this kind, executed upon a consideration
and by a corporation organized to make such bonds for profit, the rule of
construction applied to ordinary sureties is not applicable. The bond is
in the terms prescribed by the surety, and any doubtful language should
be construed most strongly against the surety, and in favor of the indem-
nity which the assured bad reasonable grounds to expect. The rule ap-
plicable to a contract of fire and life insurance is the rule, by analogy, most
applicable to a contract like that in this case."43
There was no citation of authorities, and the court assumes
as a matter of course that the situation calls for the application
of the well known rules of interpretation applied to insurance
policies. But the statement that "any doubtful language should
be construed most strongly against the surety, and in favor of
the indemnity which the assured had reasonable grounds to ex-
pect" is just another way of saying that language will be con-
strued most strongly aga"inst the party using it and that a con-
struction which gives effect to the main apparent purpose of the
contract will be favored, rules which are not peculiar to insur-
ance.44 The court notes that (a) the surety was a company or-
ganized for this very purpose of executing surety bonds; (b) it
was acting from purely profit-making motives; (c) the terms
of the bond were prescribed by the surety; (d) the conscious
and avowed object of the transaction between the surety and
plaintiff was to afford indemnity to the plaintiff for any loss
caused to him by the default of the principal; (e) it was a nor-
42Manufacturers' Accident Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan (1893), 58 Fed.
945, 946.
43Supreme Council C. K. A. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1894), 63
Fed. 48.
44 Supra, pp. 110, 111.
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mal business act of the surety to pay the loss in case of default
of the principal. It would seem that the facts suggested by (c)
and (d) call for the rules of interpretation applied by the court,
and if these facts are identical with facts found in the insurer-
insured relation, it was clearly the part of sound judicial rea-
soning as well as a matter of convenience to adopt the rules
suggested by the analogy. It is significant of the court's attitude,
that it did not call the "surety company" an "insurer" and that
it did not even call the surety's bond an insurance contract. The
court merely observes that "the rule applicable to contracts of
fire and life insurance is the rule, by analogy, most applicable to
a contract like that in this case." The court could have found
plenty of authority for its attitude in the early decisions of the
Supreme Court construing commercial guarantees.45
The court in American Surety Company v. Pauley46 stated
very accurately the general attitude of the courts toward the
problem of construing a corporate surety's contract. The court
said:
"If, looking at all its provisions, the bond is fairly and reasonably
susceptible of two constructions, one favorable to the bank, and the other
favorable to the surety company, the former, if consistent with the ob-
jects for which the bond was given, must be adopted, and this for the
reason that the instrument which the court is invited to interpret was
drawn by the attorneys, officers, or agents of the surety company. This
is a well established rule in the law of insurance."
In Carstairs v. American Bonding & Trust Co. 4 7 the court
said of corporate sureties' contracts:
"As contracts of indemnity, they will be liberally construed so as to
effectuate the purpose for which they were issued, and as, like policies
of insurance, they are generally prepared by the bonding company, the
rule of contra proferentem will often be applied in construing their stip-
ulations." 4 8
45 Supra, p. 120 et seq.
46 (1898) 170 U. S. 133.
47 (1902) 54 C. C. A. 815, 116 Fed. 449, writ certiorari denied (1902),
1870 U..S. 644, 47 L. Ed. 346, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 844.
48 The above statement is frequently quoted without the following sen-
tence which the court adopts from a statement of Chief Justice Fuller:
"But this rule can not be availed of to refine away the terms of a contract,
expressed with sufficient clearness to convey the plain meaning of the
parties, and embodying requirements compliance with which is made the
condition to liability thereon." Guaranty Co. etc. v. Mechanics Savings
Bank etc. (1901), 183 U. S. 402, 419.
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From the court's statement it is clear that it is applying the
ordinary rules already frequently referred to, which are general
rules of interpretation, i. e., that ambiguous words shall be taken
most strongly against the user, and that a construction which
gives effect to the main apparent purpose of the contract will be
favored. The court says that the contracts of surety companies
are "contracts of indemnity." What does the court mean by
"contracts of indemnity"? Certainly all surety contracts are
contracts of indemnity in the sense that the surety obligates
himself to prevent loss to the secured as a result of the default
of the principal. In this case the surety company "covenanted,
for the space of one year, to make good to the restaurant com-
pany, as employer, any pecuniary loss, to the extent of $5,000,
by reason of fraudulent or dishonest acts," etc. An ordinary
promise by an uncompensated guarantor to guarantee faithful
performance of an employee would seem to have the same pur-
pose as the contract of the defendant surety company. In either
case the purpose is to make the creditor secure. However there
is an emphasis on the certainty of "indemnity" to the creditor
in the case of the corporate surety's transaction that is not pres-
ent in the typical non-corporate surety's engagement. As pre-
viously pointed out,49 the private surety seldom deals directly
with the creditor and from the surety's standpoint the emphasis
is not so much on making the creditor safe as upon obtaining a
benefit for the principal. But the corporate surety frankly goes
after business on the basis of selling security to the creditor and
stresses security as the main purpose of the contract. To adopt
a rule of construction which would defeat the proclaimed pur-
pose of the surety's undertaking could be justified only by the
existence of countervailing considerations which are not present.
So, in the absence of any modifying considerations, the court is
merely applying a general rule of interpretation when it says:
"they will be liberally construed so as to effectuate the purpose
for which they were issued." Also, this is the rule announced
by many courts for the interpretation of "Commercial Guaran-
tees."60
A further illustration of this tendency of courts to talk about
insurance contracts, only to apply general rules of contract in-
terpretation, is found in National Surety Co. v. McCormick51 :
49 Supra p. 107 (5).
GO Supra pp. 120-122.
51 (1920) 268 F. 185.
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"It is urged that the rule of strict construction generally applicable to
the obligation of sureties should be here applied. But this is not that
ordinary contract of voluntary suretyship, as to which there has arisen a
sort of tenderness toward sureties. This is a contract of insurance, en-
tered into by the surety for the revenue which it derives from the business
of suretyship, and in this relation the obligation should be treated as other
insurance contracts, which are usually construed most strongly against the
insurer."
The court then cites Liverpool etc. Insurance Co. v. Kearney52
and this case is so frequently cited that it might be profitable to
notice what rules of interpretation the Supreme Court adopted
for insurance policies. Here are the words of the court on page
136:
"The argument in behalf of the defendant assumes that the insurance
company is entitled to a literal interpretation of the words of the policies.
But the rules established for the construction of written instruments apply
to contracts of insurance equally with other contracts. It was well said
by Nelson, Ch. J. in Turley v. North American F. Insurance Co., 25 Wend.
373, 377, referring to a condition of the policy of insurance, ' ....
that this clause of the contract of insurance is to receive a reasonable in-
terpretation; its intent and substance, as derived from the language used,
should be regarded.' There is no more reason for claiming a strict literal
compliance with its terms than in ordinary contracts. Full legal effect
should always be given to it for the purpose of guarding the company
against fraud or imposition. Beyond this, we would be sacrificing substance
to form,--following words rather than ideas.
To the general rule there is an apparent exception in the case of con-
tracts of insurance: namely, that where a policy of insurance is so framed
as to leave room for two constructions the words used should be interpreted
most strongly against the insurer. This exception rests upon the ground
that the company's attorneys, officers, or agents, prepared the policy, and
that it is the language of the company that must be interpreted."
It is evident from the above excerpt that as far as rules of
interpretation are concerned, there is no difference between the
rules applied to insurance policies and those applied to contracts
generally. The court speaks of "an apparent exception," but
as Professor Williston has shown, this so-called exception is a
sound rule of interpretation. 53 I suggest again that these rules
have been recognized by courts and applied to contracts of pri-
vate sureties in many well reasoned decisions.54
52 (1900) 180 U. S. 132.
53 Supra, p. 111 (c).
54 Supra, p. 120 et seq.
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That the courts are not trying to fix special rules of construc-
tion for corporate surety contracts is indicated by such state-
ments as the following:
'SIt is true, a surety has the right to limit his liability to the very terms
of his undertaking, but still a bond is construed in the same way as any
other contract, that is, with regard to the intention of the parties and
the purpose of the bond, as disclosed by the instrument read in the light
of the surrounding circumstances. A strained construction should not be
adopted either to hold or release a surety." 5
"A surety company for a consideration is however, entitled to have
its contract interpreted by the ordinary rules of law. And the liability
cannot be enlarged beyond the scope of the terms of the contract, and
where the language is ambiguous the question of construction does not
enter."56
"Although a surety under such bond is entitled to have the meaning
and intention of the parties determined by the same rules that the mean-
ing and intention of parties to other instruments are determined, yet in
case of ambiguity in the language used, or if doubt arises by reason of
the use of a particular term or phrase, the doubt may be and usually is,
resolved against the surety for profit, whereas it may be, and usually
is, otherwise as against a voluntary surety. In either case, however, the
surety may define and limit the scope of his obligation, and if he has
done so in apt terms, the court cannot legally enlarge upon them."57
The later decisions reveal a distinct tendency to recognize that
the rules of interpretation of contracts of surety companies are
general rules which would be applied to any contract under the
same circumstances. In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Cen-
tral National Fire Insurance Co.58 the bond required the obligee
Insurance Company to mail written notice within thirty days
of learning of "any acts which may be made the basis of any
claim hereunder." 'Held: That where principal failed to remit
sums, which his reports showed to be due, as required by his
contract, the surety company was released by reason of the
obligee's failure to notify the surety company within the thirty
day period after the default of the principal. Trieber, J., re-
marked:
"The stipulation in the bond that the obligee upon learning of any fact
which may be made a basis of any claim thereunder '..... is clear
and free from any ambiguity.' The most favorable construction the plain-
55 Evans v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (1917), 195 Mo. App. 438,
443; 192 S. W. 112.
56 Pacific County et al. v. Illinois Surety Co. (1916), 234 F. 97.
57 Blythe & Fargo Co. v. Free (1915), 46 Utah 233, 148 Pac. 427.
58 (1925) Circuit C. A., 4 Fed. 2d 203.
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tiff could ask is that it be construed as policies of insurance are, which is
that they 'must be enforced as any other contracts are. (Italics mine.) It
is only when a provision of a bond by a surety or insurance company is
ambiguous and subject to two different constructions that it will be con-
strued against the surety company."
Sanborn, circuit judge, added:
"First, conceding that the contract of this surety should be construed
in accordance with the rule for the interpretation of contracts of insur-
ance companies, nevertheless that rule is not and has not been in the Fed-
eral courts since the decision of the Supreme Court in 1893 in Imperial
Fire Insurance Co. v. Cook County59 that contracts of insurance and con-
tracts of sureties should be treated as special classes of contracts to be in-
terpreted by the rule that if the meaning of the agreements is in doubt,
the construction should be adopted which is most favorable to the assured.
(Italics mine.) But the true rule for the construction of such contracts
is that they ought to be interpreted, like other classes of contracts, ac-
cording to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties have
used, and those terms ought to be taken, understood and given effect in
their plain, ordinary and popular sense, fairly and justly to all the parties
to the contracts."60
There had been a tendency to adopt the rule referred to above,
i. e., in case of doubt resolve it against the insurer, just as in
many private surety cases the courts resolved all doubts in favor
of the surety without regard to the particular facts. This puts
sureties and insurers in a special class for purpose of construing
their contracts. This tendency in the case of insurance com-
panies naturally influenced the courts subject to the tendency,
when they were considering the contracts of surety companies
and assuming them to be insurance policies. In Maryland Cas-
ualty Co. v. Bank of England6l Stone, J., makes the following
sound observation:
"It is true that it is a rule of construction that ambiguities should be
resolved against the drawer of an instrument and that this rule has been
properly applied to insurance contracts. (American Surety Co. v. Pauly,
170 U. S. 133, 144.) However this does not mean that the contract can be
changed or refined away by this mere rule of construction nor that all other
rules of contract construction (italics mine) must stand silent in the pres-
ence of this rule.
On the whole, the decisions represent an effort to apply nor-
mal rules of interpretation to the special facts and form of the
corporate surety's contract. It is interesting to note that some
59 (1893) 151 U. S. 454, 463, 464.
60 See: Atlas Reduction Co. v. New Zealand Ins. Co., 138 Fed. 497,
499; 9 L. R. A. (n. s.) 433; National Surety Co. v. Western Pacific Ry. Co.,
200 Fed. 675, 699, 700; Dornce v. Barber, 262 Fed. 489, 491; Suzuki v. Na-
tional Surety Co., 290 Fed. 942, 943; Hawkeye Commercial Men's Assn. v.
Christy, 294 Fed. 208, 210, 211, 213.
61 (1924), 2 F. 2d 793.
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of the later opinions are saying that a corporate surety's con-
tract is "strictissimi juris," and are helping to put definite and
intelligible content into the term. Of course, if strictissimi juris
is merely an omnibus expression to camouflage lack of reasons
for results reached, and not a rule of construction or of liability
to aid in determining what results should be reached, then any
effort to determine its content will be futile.
In City of Chicago v. Southern Surety Co. 62 the court re-
marked: "It must be conceded that the obligation of a surety
is strictissimi juris and that his liability cannot be extended or
enlarged beyond the strict condition of his bond."
The court in Pacific County v. IMlinois Surety Co. 6 2a uses the
term strictissimi juris rather ambiguously, but under the facts
of the case the court is apparently connecting it with the de-
fenses of a private surety. The surety company's bond covered
a definite period of time and was conditioned that the principal,
a bank, should, from July 1, 1914, to July 1, 1915, pay on demand
all moneys deposited and, "shall from noon of the 1st day of
July, 1914, keep and hold harmless the above named . . . . of
and from all liability, loss and damage which may arise or accrue
against said treasurer by reason of the deposit."
The facts show that on the 1st day of July, 1915, the bank
had $51,175.14, which remained on deposit until the banl was
closed July 19, 1915. Due to the insolvency of the bank, the
county suffered loss. The plaintiff contended that the defendant
was liable for all deposits made during the year which were not
accounted for, irrespective of duration of time. The defendant
surety company contended that the duration of its risk extended
only for one year, and no default having occurred during that
time, there was no liability. In sustaining demurrer the district
judge said:
"The rule of strictissimi juris does not apply to sureties for compensa-
tion. The rule was only invoked for the protection of individuals acting
gratuitously. Liberal construction of liability against sureties for value is
the rule. A surety company for consideration is, however, entitled to have
its contract interpreted by the ordinary rules of law and the liability
cannot be enlarged beyond the scope of the terms of the contract, and
where the language is unambiguous the question of construction does not
arise. The language employed seems to be clear, and capable of convey-
ing but one idea, and that is the limit of liability to the 1st day of July,
1915, and giving effect to every part of the contract .... and applying
the same rules to this as any other contract .... the interpretation of
the parties appears to be conclusively established."
62 (1926) 239 Ill. App. 628.
e2a (1926) 239 Ill. App. 626.
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The court doesn't recognize any rule of interpretation which
is against the corporate surety as such, and definitely states that
the corporate surety's liability is not to be extended by implica-
tion beyond the scope of the contract. By "liberal construction
of liability against sureties for value," the court evidently means
that the absolute defenses of the private surety against liability
are not available to the compensated surety. At any rate the
court makes it clear that denying the application of the rule of
strictissimi juris to corporate sureties does not involve applying
special rules of interpretation to their contracts to the result of
unreasonably extending liability. The following excerpts are to
the same effect:
"The law is well settled that the liability of a surety upon a bond is to
be strictly construed and is to be governed by the scope and the meaning
of the instrument itself."63
"It is a well established rule that a contract of suretyship should be
strictly construed so as to impose upon the surety only such burdens as
clearly respond to the terms thereof, and should not be extended by impli-
cation or presumption to cover other burdens-not coming within its scope."64
This same distinction between taking language most strongly
against the surety company, and some vague rule of extension
of the scope of the contract was well made in Burdett v. Walsh
and others.65 The purchaser of certain shares of stock agreed
to give his note "secured to the satisfaction" of the seller. Later
the purchaser and a surety company executed a bond which re-
cited that the seller had required that the purchaser should give
him a bond to indemnify him "in the event of the failure" of the
purchaser to pay the note in accordance with his agreement. The
bond was conditioned upon the payment of the "principal and
interest of the aforesaid note." No note was executed and the
purchaser having failed to pay the purchase price which was
intended to be the principal of the note, the creditor sued on
the surety company's bond. In affirming a judgment for the
surety company the court said:
"The decisions, in cases where bonds have been given by a corporation
organized for the express purpose of giving security, under which the rule
so often declared as to the strictness with which bonds should be construed
63Maine Lumber Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1926), 214 N. Y. S.
621.
64 Commercial Nat. Bank etc. v. London, etc. Indemnity Co. (1925),
10 Fed. 2d 641.
65 (1920) 235 Mass. 153, 126 N. E. 374. See also Union Central
Life Ins. Co. v. U. S. Fidelity etc. Co. (1904), 99 Md. 423; 581 AtI. 437,
U. S. Fidelity, etc. Co. v. Overstreet (1905), 27 Ky. L. Rep. 248, 84 S. W.
764.
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has been somewhat relaxed, do not aid the plaintiff. Such decisions are
inapplicable where liability is beyond the scope of the undertaking."
SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION.
I. Ambiguities of Words and Language.
(a) The general rule of interpretation would require that am-
biguous words and language should be given the sense which is
least favorable to the one who is responsible for the ambiguity.
If the reason of this rule is that "it should be anticipated that
the person addressed will understand ambiguous language in the
sense most favorable to himself, and that his reasonable under-
standing should furnish the standard," 6 then this reason applies
to the words of any promisor whether gratuitous or otherwise.
As respects contracts of corporate surety companies, the ap-
plication of the general rule will always result in the party se-
cured getting the benefit of the rule, for the reason that the
"policy" is always issued by the company and the terms of the
contract are wholly in the carefully phrased language of the
surety.
In the case of the private surety, the words of the promise are
frequently not in any true sense the words of the surety. In
the case of bonds, which private sureties sign, the instrument is
regularly complete when presented to the surety for his signa-
ture and is drawn up with a view to protecting the interests of
the party secured. It would be absurd to construe this bond on
the assumption that the language is that of the surety. Fre-
quently the extent of the language actually used by the surety
has been, "I guarantee the within," or, "I guarantee the con-
tract," or, "I'll see you paid," etc., while the terms of the prin-
cipal obligation have furnished the verbal content of the surety's
promise. So, after all, the courts that have indiscriminatingly
applied the "more favorable to the surety" rule, have probably
been right on the factual merits most of the time.
(B) Authority.
(1) Apart from the so-called "commercial guarantees," one
may safely conclude that the majority of courts of last resort
have accepted the rule that all the ambiguities of words or lan-
guage should be taken in the sense most favorable to the private
surety.
(2) There is a strong line of cases which have adopted the
general rules of interpretation and construction for sureties'
promises and restricted the doctrine of strictissimi juris to ques-
36 Supra, p. 109.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tions affecting the liability of the surety on the basis of the prom-
ise as interpreted.
(3) The authorities are practically unanimous that in the case
of the contracts of corporate sureties all ambiguities of language
are to be taken most strongly against the surety company, a rule
which the facts invariably call for and a rule for the application
of which there is complete authority in non-corporate suretyship
cases, although the courts have usually relied upon the authority
of insurance cases.
II. CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT IN GENERAL IN FAVOR OF
THE SURETY.
The courts have not only construed particular words, phrases,
and clauses in favor of the private surety but when there has
been doubt about the application of the contract as a whole,
they have resolved the doubt in favor of the surety, even though
it involved a complete failure of the obligation. 7 This seems
to be a negation of the general rule which favors a construction
that gives effect to the main apparent purpose of the contract
and prevents forfeiture. In considering contracts of the cor-
porate surety the courts have emphasized the indemnity which
the party secured "had a right to expect," and have spoken of
"effectuating the object or purpose" for which the bond was
given. They are simply applying a general rule of interpreta-
tion, although they most often attribute their "changed attitude"
to the fact that they are dealing with a "policy of insurance."
There is no construction in favor of the corporate surety in
the above sense. That there should not be is justified by the
facts under which the corporate surety undertakes its obliga-
tion.68 As between the party secured and the surety company
it is a straight business transaction avowedly sought by the
surety on the assumption that it will secure the obligee against
loss: this "security" is furnished as a commodity and is clearly
understood by the parties to be bought by, or at least for, the
party secured. There is no fact in the situation which calls
for a modification of the rules that favor the interpretation or
construction which gives effect to this clearly understood and
avowed purpose of the transaction.
In the case of the private surety there are certain features
that lend color to the justification of a rule which, where ordi-
nary rules of interpretation have left doubt, would allow, a fail-
ure of-the contract rather than to impose liability. I suggest:
07 See State v. Medary, supra, pp. 115, 116.
68 Supra, p.
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(1) The absence of any consideration moving to the surety.
This fact destroys the basis for implications which ordinarily
arise when one party accepts and retains benefit which another
has given in expectation of receiving something in return.
(2) The absence of factors, outside the bare promise, which
might justify any reasonable expectation on the part of the
promisee that the promisor intends to obligate himself except
on the literal terms of the promise.69
III. The increasing tendency on the part of the courts to
treat the corporate surety's contract as any other contract.
With increasing frequency the courts have been declaring
that the "policy" of the surety company is to be construed as any
other contract. They thus tacitly recognize that it has not .been
necessary to call the surety's contract a policy of insurance in
order to justify the use of the rules applied or the results
reached; If the corporate surety is engaged in the business of
insurance then obviously contracts made to carry on this busi-
ness are insurance contracts, but there is no justification for
calling the surety's contract an insurance contract merely be-
cause a sameness of facts calls for the application to each of
the same general rules of interpretation.
III. INSURANCE AND CORPORATE SURETYSHIP COMPARED.
"In view of all that has been said in this immediate connection, can it
be affirmed that fidelity, commercial and judicial bonds or policies, as issued
by the so-called surety companies, constitute a contract of insurance within
the strict legal significance of the term? The answer to the foregoing
query must be unqualifiedly in the affirmative." 7o
"It can no longer be denied that a bond-making company that goes into
the market for the purpose of becoming surety for a consideration is an
insurer, instead of the old-time surety who was a favorite of the courts
and in whose favor all presumptions would be indulged."71
There is no profit in waging a battle over nomenclature un-
less some particular usage of terms is confusing important sub-
stantive considerations. If we could take a start de novo, we
might designate what we have long called suretyship by "insur-
ance," or "assurance," or "securityship," or "riskship" or -by
any other name, and as long as the term connoted the substantive
idea it would be serving the proper function of nomenclature.
Practically considered, it makes no difference whether termi-
nology precedes the content, or the content has subsequently
been put into the terminology, if the terminology has been ac-
cepted and does identify definite concepts. However, when
69 Supra, p. 107.
70 Frost, Guaranty Insurance, sec. 3, p. 18.
71 Doherty v. Surety Co., 1 Court of Appeals (Tenn.) 221.
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terms have acquired as definite a content as "insurance" and
"suretyship," it seems that nothing can be gained by applying
to a large group of transactions the terminology of insurance,
unless these transactions are characterized by those elements
which furnish the content of "insurance" as distinguished from
the content of "suretyship." It is always legitimate and usually
profitable to investigate the factors upon which such classifica-
tions rest with a view to achieving a larger synthesis in the in-
terests of pedagogical and professional economy as well as of
clarity of thinking. Assuming that there is a justification for
the subdivision of a general class of legal transactions into
"insurance" and "suretyship," it would seem that whether any
given transaction falls within the one or the other depends on
the presence or absence of the fundamental elements which
justify the classification.
I shall first consider some of the stock arguments and assump-
tions respecting this so-called "new kind of insurance."
As to insurance terminology in corporate suretyship: If cor-
porate suretyship is insurance, one must find a "risk," and an
"insurable interest," as well as an "insurer," and an "insured."
Mr. Frost in his book on "Guaranty Insurance" adopts the no-
menclature of insurance and it would seem to be pertinent to
determine whether the use of such is necessary in order to prop-
erly identify parties and ideas peculiar to insurance as distin-
guished from suretyship. The author utters the warning that
"throughout this entire work care must be taken not to confuse
the 'risk' with the perils insured against." 72 kIn the same sec-
tion he defines "risk" in terms which equally well set out the
orthodox conception of a principal. When he comes to find the
"risk" in title insurance, he has some difficulty, however. He
says, "It (the risk) is in a sense at least the grantor from whom
the insured has purchased real property." The real difficulty,
of course, inheres in the fact that in the other cases of "guaranty
insurance," the "risk" has been defined in the sense of principal
in a suretyship relation and when the author gets to "risk" in
title insurance, he is dealing with "risk" in a different sense.
Doesn't his own statement explain the difficulty?
"In most forms of insurance the risk is synonymous with the
perils insured against, but in guaranty insurance that is not
true." Isn't it precisely because the "risk" is synonymous with
the perils insured against in the case of title insurance, that
there is difficulty in finding a "risk" in the sense that Mr. Frost
72 Frost, op. cit., sec. 13.
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uses the word? There isn't any "debtor," or "employee," or
"contractor," or "official" to impersonate the "risk," because the
"risk" and the "perils insured against" come to the same thing
and exist disconnectedly from any responsible human actor, just
as they do in fire insurance. 73 In fact, Mr. Frost suggests one
of the basic distinctions between suretyship and insurance in
the following7 4 :
"Owing to the fact that in the last named branch of insurance (i. e.,
guaranty insurance) the perils insured against are invariably imperson-
ated, not in the lawless and uncontrollable forces of nature, but in the ac-
tion of man as a responsible human agent, the term "risk" here has refer-
ence to a human personality whose conduct along certain designated lines
constitutes the perils insured against. Thus it appears that the term
herein used relates solely to a personality entering into contract obligations,
and possessing contractual rights which the court will recognize and en-
force." (Italics mine.)
Paraphrasing the above it would not be in the least inaccurate
or misleading to say that a surety 'insures" against the perils
of the "conduct along certain designated lines"- of a person "as
a responsible human agent," and that since the "perils" insured
against are perils which have legal significance only in case the
"risk" falls short of the conduct which he, as a responsible
human agent is legally bound to observe, and since that is just
another way of saying that the "insurer" has promised to an-
swer "for the debt, default, or miscarriage" of another, it seems
that the elaborate quest for a "risk" ends in uncovering a "prin-
cipal" in the ordinary tripartite suretyship relation.
The following is taken from the same work and illustrates
the artificial distinctions which are insisted .upon:
"Certain principles may now be regarded as settled:
"1. That the risk is not ordinarily a party to the contract of insurance.
"2. That as between the 'insurer' and the 'risk' the relationship of
principal and surety exist.
"3. That as between the insured and the risk some contractual rela-
73 It would be possible for a "title insurance policy" to be in effect a
bond securing the warranty of a vendor, and in that case it would be a
surety obligation. But ordinarily it "insures against," or "warrants the
non-existence of defects of title." "A policy of insurance means the opin-
ion of the company, which issues it, as to the validity of the title, backed
by an agreement to make that opinion good in case it should prove to be
mistaken, and loss should result in consequence to the insured." Foehren-
bach v. Title & Trust Co. (1907), 217 Pa. St. 331, 336; 66 Atl. 561.
74 Mr. Frost is making a distinction between "other forms of insurance"
and "guaranty insurance." The writer believes that he is really putting
his finger on one of the basic factual distinctions between "insurance" and
"suretyship," and by his test puts "guaranty insurance" within the cate-
gory of suretyship.
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tionship must exist, upon which may be predicated certain existing or con-
templated property rights, enforceable in law against the latter by the
former.
"4. The respective liability of the insurer and the 'risk' to the insured
is not a joint obligation but is a several, and each rests upon distinct and
separate grounds.
"5. In case of official bonds signed by both the 'risk' and the insurer,
the 'risk' is a proper party defendant in any action brought by the insured
against the insurer to recover for alleged defalcations of the risk under
bond. The rule appears to be different in the case of private bonds. While
it is true that the 'irisk' not infrequently joins with the insurer in subscrib-
ing his name to the policy issued, this is not done with the purpose of
making him a party to the insurance contract entered into between the
insurer and the insured, but with the intent of evidencing in this formal
manner his consent to the terms and his promise to indemnify the insurer."
One wonders what "principles" in the above have been settled
as questions of "guaranty insurance" that had not been long
settled in suretyship. As to the first "principle," it seems to be
merely a statement tf what is the usual situation in a surety
case. Ordinarily the principal is not a party to the promise of
the surety, in one sense cannot be, although joint, or joint and
several, promises of principal and surety are common when the
obligation is to pay money. This is purely a matter of conveni-
ence or expediency, however, and involves no distinguishing
principle.
Number two appears to be a "guaranty insurance" way of
saying "risk" and "insurer" are principal and surety, while
number three is an involved statement of what in suretyship
is expressed by the rule that there must be a principal obliga-
tion as a prerequisite to a surety's obligation.
Four and five sum up the usual suretyship situation in "guar-
anty insurance" terminology, i. e., that the respective liabilities
of the principal and surety do not ordinarily spring from a joint
obligation but from distinct undertakings, the principal's from
the principal contract and the surety's from his special promise.
While the principal cannot in any true sense be a surety for him-
self, yet he can give his promisee a more effective remedy by
joining in the surety's bond. It has been simply stated as fol-
lows:
"The latter (the principal) is already liable to the obligee upon the
contract which the bond secures, and no additional liability is created by
including him'as a party to the bond, although it serves a useful purpose
in the matter of the remedy for enforcing the liability, if both are parties to
the b6nd, since the instrument may be declared upon in a single action
against both."75
75 Stearns on Suretyship, p. 191.
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This applies equally whether the "insurer" is a private non-
compensated surety or the surety is a compensated guaranty-
insurer.
Mr. Frost calls attention to the disposition of the courts to
talk suretyship while deciding "judicial insurance" cases:
"However, here, as in other forms of 'guaranty insurance' the contract
being entered into for a consideration and not gratuitous, this marked dis-
position of the courts to apply to judicial insurance bonds, the rule of pri-
vate suretyship rather than the principal of insurance law cannot well be
reconciled on grounds of judicial consistency."
Mr. Frost also gives several very good reasons why the courts
do not talk of "insurance" while considering judicial "insurance
bonds." But since, in Mr. Frost's view, the fact of compensa-
tion has made corporate suretyship into guaranty insurance, he
is naturally at a loss to explain the perversity of courts that
insist upon treating judicial sureties as sureties. He points out,
however, that the form, language, and, he might have added,
the intent, or purpose, and scope of such contracts, are fixed
by statute or by usage: he also notes absence of "proposals, ap-
plications, representations, etc. The simple explanation is that
the scope and purpose of the judicial bond being supplied with-
out reference to the methods used by the surety or his motives
in entering into the obligation, the courts are not faced with the
problem of discovering the intention of the parties from their
acts. The reasonable expectation of the parties, as inferred from
the presence or absence of a money premium or the methods
used by the surety in connection with the transaction, is not im-
portant. So, being relieved of the necessity of applying any spe-
cial analogy the courts do not use insurance terms and conse-
quently these decisions cannot be quoted as support for the prop-
osition that this particular manifestation of corporate suretyship
is judicial insurance. The courts may even be as naive as-the
Court of Appeals of New York and take the simple attitude sug-
gested by the following: "the section (of a legislative act) refers
to any surety or sureties, and the appellant (corporate surety)
is a surety."
While discussing "judicial insurance,"7 6 and regretting that
the courts were not making a distinction between contracts of
private sureties and those of compensated sureties, the author
gets comfort from In re Thurber,77 remarking:
"* * * indeed, evidence is not wanting of a tendency on the part
of the courts to apply to the contract of the compensated surety different
76 Frost, op. cit., p. 626.
77 (1899) 43 N. Y. App. Div. 528; 60 N. Y. S. 198.
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rules of construction from those applied in the case of private sureties.
Thus in the matter of Thurber, the Appellate division of the New York
Supreme Court had occasion to consider an application on the part of a
'surety company' to be released from its liability under an administration
bond, based on certain provisions of New York code, which it was claimed
were only applicable to private sureties."
The author then quotes from the Appellate Division's opinion
in which it refuses to release a surety company on the ground
that surety companies, not having been specifically named in
the act were not included in the generic term "surety or sure-
ties." This seems to be distinction with a vengeance. The
author adds:
"When this same case was heard later by the New York Court of Ap-
peals, the latter, while refusing to adopt the general line of reasoning of
the lower court, nevertheless observed that no rule of law required that
the agreement should receive a narrow or a strict construction. Its mean-
ing must be ascertained from the language therein contained, and having
arrived at that from a consideration of the whole instrument, effect must
be given to the intention of the parties as thus ascertained."
A casual perusal of the decision of the Court of Appeals will
reveal that Mr. Frost's statement that the Court of Appeals re-
fused to "adopt the general line of reasoning of the lower court"
is a very mild, if not misleading statement of the reviewing
court's attitude. The order of the Appellate Division was re-
versed, and upon the specific ground that the statute included
surety companies. (Incidentally, the references to interpreta-
tion are directed toward the interpretation of the statute, and
not to that of the surety's contract.) The Appellate Division
said that surety companies were not included because not espe-
cially mentioned. The Court of Appeals said:
"As the legislature did not make any exception, we cannot, for there
is no basis for exception by implication. The section refers to any surety
or sureties, and the appellant is a surety. Having contracted as a surety
in the manner authorized by the code, it can avail itself of such remedies
as the code provides for sureties generally."78
Indemnity against peril of loss: Among the reasons stressed
by the courts as a justification for cataloging the contracts of
corporate sureties as insurance contracts is that it "indemnifies"
against the "peril of loss." An illustration of the typical phrase-
ology and line of reasoning is furnished by Shakman v. U. S.
Credit System. 79 This case partly turned on whether a certain
78 The court of appeals further held that it was discretionary, on the
facts, whether a surety should be released, and remitted the proceedings for
action, the court below having ruled that as a matter of law the section did
not apply to surety companies (1900), 162 N. Y. 244.
79 (1896) 92 Wis. 366; 66 N. W. 528, 32 L. R. A. 383.
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person was an agent of the defendant company. By statute an
insurance company would be bound generally by the acts of an
agent similar to the ones performed by the alleged agent of the
defendant company. The court came to the conclusion that:
"the contract being, then, a contract of insurance, and the defendant's
business being the making of such contracts, it follows that the defendant
is an insurance corporation."
In deciding that the contract was one of insurance the court
reasoned thus:
"An insurance contract is a contract whereby one party agrees to
wholly or partially indemnify another for a loss or damage which he may
suffer from a specified peril. The peril of loss by the insolvency of cus-
tomers is just as definite and real a peril to a merchant or manufacturer
as the peril of loss by accident, fire or tornado, and is, in fact, much more
frequent. No reason is perceived why a contract of indemnification against
this ever present peril is not just as legitimately a contract of insurance as
a contract which indemnifies against the more familiar but less frequent
peril by fire."
"Indemnity" against "peril of loss," according to the court, is
the peculiar mark of an insurance contract and consequently
any contract which purports to indemnify against peril of loss
is an insurance contract. The validity of this conclusion is de-
stroyed, however, by the fact that "indemnity" is used in differ-
ent senses and that the element of a binding obligation to pay
upon a contingency (i. e., the existence of a "peril of loss") is
common to all aleatory contracts, of which insurance contracts
and promises of sureties, as well as wagers, are merely subdivi-
sions.8 0 It is true that a surety's promise may assume such a
form that legal contingency is eliminated, but as between the
parties, there is the factual contingency of the principal's not
performing. It can be plausibly urged that the insurer and
surety both assume a risk, either gratuitously or for a premium
which is given in exchange for the promise, not for the perform-
ance.81 The real "consideration" for the performance of the
promise is the loss suffered or threatened by the happening of
80 Williston on Contracts, see. 888.
81 "An ordinary contract of guaranty or insurance is unobjectionable
(i. e., not a wager) because the happening of the condition on which per-
formance depends is injurious to the promisee and performance of the
promise is in the nature of compensation for the injury." Willison, op. cit.,
sec. 1665.
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the event upon which performance of the promise depends. "In-
demnity" has never had a fixed meaning even in insurance usage.
In the early days of insurance under the common law, these con-
tracts of wager in which one party had an interest at stake
apart from the wager itself were called contracts of indemnfty,
to distinguish them from what we now class as pure wagers.8 2
Mansfield speaks of "two sorts of policies of insurance, mercan-
tile and gaming policies," and remarks that "the first are con-
tracts of indemnity only." After wager policies were made il-
legal, indemnity did not relate to the amount to be paid but to
the "interest," in the sense of the insurable interest. With the
development of life insurance, it became necessary to recognize
the distinction between "a contract to pay a fixed sum of money
on the happening of an event certain to occur, but uncertain as
to time," and "a contract to repair loss resulting from a happen-
ing which may or may not come to pass." 83  Indemnity was
identified with the latter and became the standard for determin-
ing the amount to be paid, and ceased to distinguish a contract
based on "interest" from a wagering agreement. Thus, con-
tracts of fire and marine insurance became contracts of indem-
nity, while life insurance contracts are not, although all must
rest on an insurable interest. The very nature of the insurance
transaction requires that ordinarily the obligation of the in-
surer is discharged by repairing actual loss from impairment or
destruction of property due to the happening of the contingency.
The insurer doesn't undertake that a hail storm will not strike
the property of the insured, but to repair the injury done by
the storm. So, the special insurance sense of a contract of in-
demnity is a contract to transfer a loss actually suffered, from
the owner of the interest damaged, to the insurer.
The term "indemnity" is frequently used, however, to express
protection against an actual loss. This is illustrated by the con-
tracts in Employers' Liability Insurance. In one of the earlier
of these cases84 the policy was "for indemnity against claims for
compensation for personal injuries, etc.," and there was an
agreement to pay "the employer . . . .all sums for which it
may become liable to its employees." The employer was forbid-
den to settle claims without the consent of the assurance cor-
poration. The plaintiff, an employee of the Steel Company, had
recovered judgment against it, and this suit is against the As-
S2Lowry v. Bourdine (1780), 2 Doug. 468.
83 11 H. R. R. 512, 514.
84 Haven v. West Superior etc. Co., Employers' Liability Assurance Cor-
portation, Garnishee (1896), 93 Wis. 201, 32 L. R. A. 388.
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surance Corporation, garnishee, as debtor of the judgment de-
fendant. The Assurance Corporation urged that it was not obli-
gated to pay the Steel Company anything until it had paid the
employee. The court disposed of this contention as follows:
"It will be seen that both provisions in the body of the policy and the
conditions indorsed thereon and made a part of it are inconsistent with
any reasonable theory other than that the contract of insurance is one of
indemnity against liabilities and that actual damages is not a condition
precedent to the maintenance of an action thereon. It not only clearly con-
templates that such an action may be brought before actual payment of
the claim for damages by the assured, but by plain and unmistakable lan-
guage it contracts to indemnify the assured against liability, not against
damages."
Indemnity, as referring to the right of the surety to be reim-
bursed by the principal, is a familiar incident of the suretyship
relation. But it is also common for the surety to be indemnified
against liability, or for some one to covenant "to save him harm-
less," in which cases he is entitled to receive payment before
discharging the principal obligation.
A surety's obligation may often be in effect an agreement to
indemnify in the literal sense of repairing loss. Take the case
when S becomes surety for P and his obligation is conditioned
upon P's faithful performance of his duties as bank cashier.
P embezzles $10,000 of the employer's money. By undertaking
that P should faithfully perform, S assumed the risk of loss to
the bank in case P should unfaithfully perform. The contin-
gency, an act or acts of unfaithful performance, has occurred
and the bank has suffered actual damage and the surety must
repair the loss. Yet no one has suggested that S is an insurer,
unless "he" happens to be a surety company.
A recent New York case86 effectively demonstrates the un-
soundness of assuming that a corporate surety's contract is one
of indemnity and therefore a contract of insurance. The defen-
dant in this case had executed a bond to secure the performance
by the principal of a contract to furnish the plaintiff with a cer-
tain quantity of lumber. By the terms of the contract, the pur-
chasing company, the obligee in the bond, agreed to make ad-
vances to the seller through acceptance of bills drawn on the pur-
chaser by the seller. The principal failed to deliver the lumber
as agreed and the plaintiff sued the surety company and included
in its claim of damages an item based on the difference between
the contract price and the market price of the lumber which had
86Accord: Anoka Lumber Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1895), 63
Minn. 286, 30 L. R. A. 690.
86 Maine Lumber Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1926), 214 N. Y. S. 621.
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not been delivered. Now the courts have frequently stressed the
indemnity element in the contracts of corporate surety com-
panies as the special mark of "guaranty insurance" as distin-
guished from ordinary suretyship. If "indemnity" has acquired
a definite and fixed meaning it is the repairing of a loss or dam-
age actually incurred. The surety company, apparently relying
upon the words of the courts, in respect to a corporate surety's
bond's being a contract of indemnity, insisted that it was not
liable for the damages claimed as result of failure to deliver.
The court did not agree:
"The respondent contends that no damage could arise from defendant's
failure to deliver the lumber, unless the plaintiff went into the open mar-
ket and actually bought lumber to take its place, and that the damage
would then be the price actually paid. This might be so if the bond war
one of indemnity, where liability must have been actually paid to become
a loss or damage. We think the respondent is wrong in such contention.
The instrument clearly shows that the bond was one of surety rather than
of indemnity. The undertaking of the respondent in this bond was of sure-
tyship for the performance of the contract by the Tazewell Timber Cor-
poration. The application of indemnity is to the indemnitor's principal,
while that of suretyship is to a third party for the default of the principal.
The respondent undertook to make good if the Tazewell corporation did
not. The primary obligation of the respondent to the plaintiff was the
obligation of the Tazewell Timber Corporation under its contract with the
plaintiff. The respondent's obligation was to become liable to the plaintiff
in case the Tazewell corporation failed to perform its contract with the
plaintiff, or to pay any damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of
such non-performance. The bond in suit is a surety bond, and not a bond
of indemnity. .... In case the Tazewell corporation should fail to per-
form its contract with the plaintiff, the respondent would become liable for
damages-not to indemnify the plaintiff for damages, but to pay plaintiff's
damages."
The case just quoted from not only throws light on the in-
demnity point but goes to the heart of the whole question of the
distinction between suretyship and insurance. All the compli-
cating factors of "compensation," "application," "representa-
tions and warranties," "method of doing business," "organized
for profit," "indemnity expected" ad infinitum were no doubt
present in the case, but the court did not even refer to insurance
or guaranty insurance. The court pointed out that "indemnity"
is not simply a matter of repairing damages, but is the subject
of an independent, primary, bi-lateral obligation. "The appli-
cation of indemnity is to the indemnitor's principal, while that
of suretyship is to a third party for the default of the principal."
Apparently the "risk" which a corporate surety assumes is the
same species of risk which a private surety assumes and the "in-
demnity" which it undertakes to make is the same sort as that
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of a private surety. There is no basis here for classifying a
corporate surety's contract as an insurance contract. It is true
that Mr. Frost and many of the courts emphasize the fact of
compensation and the special methods of the corporate surety
in getting business, but it is not conceivable that an insurance
contract would become a contract of a surety if the insurance
company should issue it gratis and without the formality of an
application. If A should agree with B that A would stand any
loss caused to B's hay by fire in consideration of B's storing it
in the barn of A's brother at an agreed price per month, and if
lightning should strike the barn and the hay should be burned
up, A would clearly be liable to indemnify B, and as an insurer.
On the other hand if A should sign a security bond for B's
faithful performance of his duties as cashier for X Bank for a
consideration and after a thorough investigation of both X Bank
and B, with or without warranties or representations, no court
would call A an insurer.
Much of the talk about contracts of insurance has no doubt
been due to the fact that most of the corporate surety cases have
turned on the construction of the contract and the emphasis has
been on the contract of the surety and not on the suretyship re-
lation. Essentially suretyship is a legal relation which results
from the fact that P and S are both bound to C to discharge an
obligation, which as between P and S should fall ultimately upon
P, the obligation being in fact P.'s Ordinarily S's obligation to
C rests upon a contract, by the terms of which he binds him-
self "to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage" of P, and
this contract is regularly referred to as the contract of surety-
ship: but, as indicated above, suretyship is a relation and not a
contract. The law recognizes this relation as existing only when
C holds two legal obligations, running from two different obli-
gors, but comprehending one claim; which claim, as between the
two obligors, ought to be satisfied by one to the complete dis-
charge of the other. If the one who ought to discharge the
claim fails to do so, the holder of the two obligations can en-
force the claim against the other obligor, and having done this
he cannot enforce the other obligation. It is this peculiar tri-
partite legal relation among the party secured, the principal
obligor, and the surety that "gives rise to all the learning in the
field of suretyship law."87  The security contract between the
secured and the surety, which usage probably justifies our speak-
ing of as the contract of suretyship, need not purport to create
87 Stearns, op. cit., p. 410.
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or define the suretyship relation. This contract may on its face
be an absolute undertaking, and still if the promisor is in fact
binding himself as security for another's obligation, the surety-
ship relation arises. Also there are situations where the surety-
ship relation exists without any preliminary security contract
between a surety and the party secured. Common examples oc-
cur when one purchases property subject to a mortgage and as-
sumes the debt,88 or when, upon the dissolution of a partnership,
one partner assumes the payment of the firm debts.8 9 In both
these cases we have the essential elements of the suretyship rela-
tion and the law imposes all the incidents that attach to that re-
lation.
The insurance relation is essentially bilateral; the contract
between the insurer and the insured creates and contemplates
a bilateral relation, and the relation springs wholly from the
contract. It is true that certain legal incidents attach without
regard to the contract, or even despite the contact, but there
are no rights, duties, and liabilities depending upon the existence
of a relation between either the insurer or the insured and a
third person. In the insurance contract the insurer agrees to
assume as his own, a .loss, which may or may not happen to the
insured, the ambit of the legal relation including only the two.
Legally speaking, in a suretyship arrangement, no one contracts
to suffer a loss, although actually, the surety may. Legally the
insurer contracts to suffer a loss in place of the insured. But
suppose the loss occurs to the insured because of the wrongful
act of a third person under such circumstances that the insured
has a claim against him for the loss. The insured has two rights
in respect to the claim for damages, one against the wrongdoer
and one against the insurer on the contract of insurance. As
between the wrongdoer and the insurer the loss should fall upon
the former, so we have the essential elements of a surety rela-
tion, and the law so treats it. The insurance contract, however,
is no more a contract of suretyship than the mortgage or part-
nership arrangement spoken of above.
Of course it is obvious that if S executes a contract in favor
of C by the terms of which S agrees to answer for the failure of
P to perform a contract or discharge a duty owing to C, S might
be called an "insurer," and can be said to have assumed a "risk."
But the simplest agreement of an accommodation surety and
88 Calvo v. Davies (1878), 73 N. Y. 211. "The grantee, by assuming
payment became principal debtor and the relation between him and his
grantoi was that of principal and surety."
89 Stearns, op. cit., p. 125.
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the most intricately worded "policy" of a surety corporation
equally imply an assumption of a "risk" and the creation of an
"insurance" relation in a non-technical sense. Likewise there
is no more justification for applying the term "indemnity insur-
ance" to the obligation of a corporate surety than to that of an
accommodation surety. The better usage seems to have been to
apply the term "indemnity" to an independent obligation to pro-
tect or relieve the promisee from a loss, as distinguished from
the collateral obligation of a surety to make good the failure of
his principal to perform an obligation. The courts stressed the
difference between a contract to indemnify and a contract to
guarantee, in deciding whether certain promises were within
the statute of Frauds, i. e., whether there was a "promise" to
answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, or a
promise to a person to indemnify him against loss from his own
obligation owing to another. So the surety's right to re-imburse-
ment from the principal is a right of indemnity, and it is com-
mon for the principal to execute an express contract to indem-
nify the surety.
The foregoing observations simply come to this: suretyship
and insurance have much common ground and an occasional
twilight zone, but there are certain fundamental distinctions
that cannot be disposed of by a catch-all terminology. As to the
rights, duties, and liabilities of the principal, surety, and part
secured, inter sese, assuming that the surety-secured contract
presents no difficulties of interpretation or construction, it is
submitted that rules of insurance law cannot apply, and for the
obvious reason that rules of insurance are functus officio when
the rights and liabilities of the two principals to the one insur-
ance contract have been determined. As said above, the ambit
of the legal relation created by an insurance contract does not
include a third person.
Considering merely the contract between surety and party se-
cured, and the insurer-insured contract, there is no reason why
the same rules f interpretation and construction may not be
properly applied, if the facts so justify. There has not been any
sui generis contract of suretyship and there is no reason why a
contract of a surety company cannot be interpreted and con-
strued by whatever rules the facts require, without any necessity
of putting it into the category of insurance contracts.
It has been said that the "business" of the corporate surety is
writing contracts of insurance. This apparently presupposes
that a surety company cannot have as its business the entering
into the suretyship relation by means of a contract. It is sim-
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ply selling its credit by assuming a suretyship relation through
the instrumentality of a contract. The contract creates the bond
between the surety company and the party secured, and the law
creates the suretyship relation.
A great deal of the insistence that corporate suretyship is "a
new kind of insurance" has been due to the assumption that put-
ting the transactions of the corporate surety in the same cate-
gory with those of the individual surety required the applica-
tion of identical rules for the interpretation of the contract and
the determination of liability, and identical and stereotyped re-
sults. This attitude is a corollary of the idea so prevalent a few
decades ago that every situation had to be brought within a
formal legal category wherein doctrinal rules of supposed gen-
eral validity automatically produced the proper result. The old
equitable doctrines which had been utilized to protect the surety
and secure his legitimate interests had hardened into rules of
law applied by the courts as type rules for type cases. That a
transaction with new factual conditions calling for a modifica-
tion of the traditional categorical results could be included
frankly as a suretyship transaction and yet not require the ap-
plication of all of the stereotyped rules associated with surety-
ship, was by no means obvious to the courts of thirty years ago.
Consequently, some of the earlier decisions with sound recogni-
tion of the fundamental question involved put the corporate
surety transactions into the right category, and then, with the
courage of their convictions as to the validity of categorical re-
sults, disregarded the legal significance of the new facts. But
the vast majority of the courts, realizing the absurdity of reach-
ing the results which apparently had to be reached by applica-
tion of the traditional rules of suretyship, seized upon the near-
est category and sought consistency by talking about "insurance"
and "policies" of insurance. The early cases all turned, or were
forced to turn, on questions of interpretation of the bond given
by the surety company. The form and phraseology and the oc-
casional use of the word "insurance" by the company, suggested
the easy solution of identifying the contracts of surety com-
panies with insurance policies, and presto, the rules of interpre-
tation and construction and of warranties and representations
associated with insurance automatically became available. The
courts overlooked a line of well reasoned suretyship cases which
furnished abundant authority for the application of the rules
of interpretation and construction demanded by the facts of the
transactions of corporate sureties. It has not always been clear
what the courts really meant when they used such terms as "in-
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surance" and "insurance business" and "policy insurance." The
later cases indicate that on the whole the courts are using the
analogy of insurance rules where applicable, but are not attempt-
ing to subsume corporate suretyship under insurance. Even
when the courts are insisting that the corporate surety is an
insurer and that the contract of the surety company is an insur-
ance contract, it is frequently evident that the term insurance
is not being used in the usual technical sense. This is well illus-
trated in the case of State ex rel. Peach Company v. Bonding and
Surety Company.90 The court said:
"In the bonds or policies of guaranty insurance, the more
natural attitude of a surety is assumed, but they are contracts
of insurance none the less. In fact the contract of suretyship
is inherently that of insurance. The surety is an insurer of the
debt, the fidelity, or the undertaking of his principal, and when
he engages in the business of furnishing surety for hire, his
obligation is no longer construed under the strictissimi rule, but
is subject to the rules of construction applicable to insurance
policies generally. So that speaking generally the contracts of
suretyship issued by surety companies, organized for the pur-
pose of furnishing surety for hire, such as the defendant, are
contracts of insurance."
It is significant that, according to the court, "the contract of
suretyship is inherently that of insurance"; that "the surety is
an insurer of the debt, the fidelity, or the undertaking of the
principal," and it is only when "he (the surety) engages in the
business of furnishing surety for hire" that the contracts of the
surety become contracts of insurance. But, as the court states,
the surety company is furnishing "surety for hire" and not in-
surance. In short, the surety company is selling "surety" and
the ordinary private surety is giving it away and it would seem
that they are both sureties, or that they are both "insurers of
the debt, fidelity, or undertaking of the principal."
(To Be Continued.)
90 (1919) 279 Mo. 535; 215 S. W. 20.
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